Why Should We Accept Capital Punishment: A Defence to Kant’s Retributivism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37420/j.mlr.2026.009Keywords:
capital punishment, retention, abolition, Kant, retributivismAbstract
The Kant’s defense of the capital punishment and its contemporary significance is an important topic in the field of legal philosophy. In his philosophy of right, Kant explicitly supports the retention of the capital punishment from a retributive standpoint, arguing that for extreme crimes such as deliberate murder and subversion of state authority, the capital punishment is the only punishment that aligns with the principles of equality and proportionality, reflecting an absolute commitment to justice. He opposes the consequentialist approach that justifies the capital punishment based on social outcomes, emphasizing that punishment should respect rational persons rather than be used as a mere tool. Although Kant advocates for the sanctity of the right to life in his moral philosophy, he believes that within the realm of legal rights, the community has the authority to exact retribution on offenders who violate others’ right to life, and this retribution does not violate the social contract or the self-legislation of rational beings. In response to contemporary criticisms regarding the inconsistency of the principle of equality, the risk of wrongful convictions, and objections based on contract theory, Kant’s theories provide effective counterarguments. Ultimately, Kant’s views on the capital punishment offer contemporary criminal policy a third path that transcends both radical abolitionism and harsh penalism, suggesting that while the capital punishment should be retained as a last resort for upholding justice, its application must be strictly limited and adhere to humanitarian principles.